Coming of Age in the Global Village by Curtis, James M.
Oral Tradition, 2/1 (1987): 357-70 
Coming of Age in the Global Village
James M. Curtis
I wish to analyze in this paper three acts of violence directed 
against public fi gures: Arthur Bremer’s attempt to assassinate George 
Wallace in 1972; John Hinckley, Jr.’s attempt to assassinate President 
Reagan in 1982; and Mark David Chapman’s unfortunately successful 
attempt to kill John Lennon in 1981. Each of these three acts was 
inextricably bound up with popular culture, and the sensibilities of the 
psychotic young men who committed them were formed by popular 
culture.
Yet as of now we have no way of discussing or analyzing 
this relationship—much less of understanding or ameliorating it. To 
explain this situation, I turned to my favorite of Walter Ong’s books, 
The Presence of the Word (1967), where Father Ong reminds us that 
“The word moves toward peace because the word mediates between 
person and person. No matter how much it gets caught up in currents of 
hostility, the word can never be turned into a totally warlike instrument. 
So long as two persons keep talking, despite themselves they are not 
totally hostile” (192). It would seem, then, that if we could fi nd a way 
to analyze popular culture—and not simply praise or condemn it—we 
might be able to change its effects.
Indeed, there is some evidence that this is the case. One 
psychological study (Leyens et al. 1976) showed that subjects who 
were taught to perceive violent movies aesthetically—in terms of 
composition and focus, for example—showed little if any change in 
their behavior after watching such movies. By contrast, a control group 
did become more aggressive after watching the same movies. Another 
study (Huesman et al. 1983) showed that children were hardly affected at 
all by violent television if they learned to write essays about them. Since 
the word moves toward peace, this is only what we would expect.
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Let us consider whether an application of some of the principles 
which have informed the thought of Walter Ong may not help us begin 
an irenic dialogue about popular culture. For one thing, the three violent 
acts which I mentioned were committed by men and directed against men, 
and thus may be considered perverted forms of the agonistic structures, 
or ritualized contest, which Father Ong has discussed in Fighting for 
Life (1981). Ranging widely over the psychological, sociological, and 
anthropological literature which has appeared since Bruno Bettelheim’s 
analogous Symbolic Wounds (1955), Father Ong has shown that such 
behavior has deep biological roots, and appears virtually everywhere 
in world culture. In traditional oral cultures, agonistic structures often 
serve as a rite of passage through which young men come of age, and 
achieve an identity as adults. They thus involve a twofold movement of 
enduring hardship and attaining some worthwhile things, such as status 
in one’s society, by doing so.
Yet agonistic structures do evolve. As Father Ong puts it, “The 
fate of agonistic structures is tied in with the history of verbalization, and 
in particular with the technologizing of the word . . . . The conversion or 
technologizing of verbal performance gives the word and thought itself 
marvelous new powers and restructures the psyche” (1981:26). Since 
the effect of literacy is to foster the privatization of consciousness, what 
happens to agonistic structures, which are a form of socialization?
In Fighting for Life, Ong comments that, “The art of oratory, 
always highly agonistic, atrophied spectacularly after the advent of 
print” (26). Print changed other forms of verbal expression as well. The 
rise of the vernacular languages of Europe, associated as it was with 
printing, made Latin less useful. In his article “Latin Language Study as 
a Renaissance Puberty Rite,” Ong has argued that “when Latin passed 
out of vernacular usage, it created a sharp distinction between those who 
knew it and those who did not” (1971:119). As a knowledge of Latin 
became increasingly irrelevant, it took on more and more meaning as a 
puberty rite, as an agonistic experience.
Puberty rites did not die out as fewer and fewer boys studied 
Latin, however. Although he does not use the term, Neil Postman 
has suggested in a recent book that the acquisition of literacy in any 
language, not just Latin, is a form of puberty rite. He interprets literacy 
as having created childhood in the sense that in
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a literate society children who want to know what adults know must 
learn to read. Moreover, “when one learns to read, one learns a peculiar 
way of behaving of which physical immobility is only one feature. Self-
restraint is a challenge not only to the body but to the mind as well” 
(1982:76).
In “Romantic Difference and the Poetics of Technology” 
(1971:255-83) and in other works as well, Father Ong has shown that 
the long-lasting stage in the evolution of consciousness which we know 
as Romanticism is an expression of a literate mentality. Wordsworth’s 
attack on the use of oral commonplaces serves as only one example of this 
change. Another example is the famous fi nal line of “She Dwelt among 
the Untrodden Ways”: “Lucy’s in her grave and, oh, the difference to 
me.” Notice that Wordsworth does not develop a comparison or a conceit 
to express his grief, as an earlier poet might have done; he internalizes 
it, as we would expect a literate person to do. The nature of his grief 
remains unknown, just as Lucy herself remained unknown in life.
We all know that the Romantics promoted a cult of spontaneity, 
and praised childlike naturalness; in the present context, it would appear 
that they were implicitly denying the need for agonistic experiences, and 
indeed the need for maturation of any kind. The Romantic admiration for 
naturalness and spontaneity has a democratizing quality, for it assumes 
that we are all natural, spontaneous—at least in the beginning. Thus, 
such Romantic attitudes spread rapidly in America, the most democratic 
country, and became an essential element of American consciousness.
If Romanticism de-emphasized agonistic experiences, and if 
America is a profoundly Romantic country, then it follows that American 
culture—literate as it was from the very beginning—will de-emphasize 
agonistic experiences and the need for the evolutionary maturation of 
the ego.
These remarks may help to create a context in which we can 
understand the meaning of television, as it fosters secondary orality 
in America. Since the Romantics praised the childlike quality of the 
human psyche, they might well have taken to television. Television, is, 
after all, accessible to all. Unlike pictographic or alphabetic literacy, 
“television offers a fairly primitive but irresistible alternative to the 
linear and sequential logic of the printed word and tends to make the 
rigors of a literate education irrelevant. . . . Unlike books, which vary 
greatly in their lexical
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and syntactical complexity and which may be scaled according to the 
ability of the reader, the TV image is available to everyone, regardless 
of age” (Postman 1982:79). Children can watch television from the age 
of thirty-six months, and do not signifi cantly improve in their ability 
to watch television. If we associate the Romantics with childlike states 
of mind expressed in the vernacular, then television is a profoundly 
Romantic medium.
This profoundly Romantic medium has made all parts of the 
world instantly accessible to each other, and has thus collapsed it into 
a global village, to use Marshall McLuhan’s term. Yet the American 
part of this global village has a consciousness processed through and 
through by literacy. It tends to believe that maturation is unnecessary and 
probably undesirable, and thus it tends not to produce fully developed 
narratives of maturation or fully developed agonistic structures. As 
a case in point, Leslie Fiedler (1960) has noted the frequency with 
which children appear as major characters in American fi ction from 
Mark Twain’s Huck Finn to J. D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that clinical psychologist Dan Kiley has 
concluded that “All across our land, our male children are refusing to 
grow up” (1983:24). Kiley considers this trend so important that he calls 
it the Peter Pan Syndrome, after Sir James Barrie’s character who said “I 
want always to be a little boy and to have fun” (22). No one conspired 
to produce the Peter Pan Syndrome, for it has appeared as a response to 
our historical situation. As Kiley puts it, “during the past ten or fi fteen 
years, political events and media strategy have thrust our male children 
into a monumental sex role confl ict” (30). How, then, do boys come of 
age in the global village?
One answer is that they do so through televised sports. As Father 
Ong has said, “Millions of males across the world know virtually no 
subject of sustained conversation other than spectator sports” (1981:152). 
It is certainly true that many American boys choose as role models men 
who play games. Although spectator sports may have an allegorical 
quality, they do not provide a narrative, and their relevance as models 
for behavior is thus limited.
In fact, sociologist David P. Phillips (1983) has linked televised 
championship boxing matches to homicide. He has shown that for 
the period 1973-1978 it is consistently the case that three days after a 
nationally televised championship boxing match in
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which a white male lost, there was a statistically signifi cant increase 
in homicides of white males. Similarly, three days after a nationally 
televised championship boxing match in which a black male lost, there 
was a statistically signifi cant increase in homicides of black males. 
Social psychologists call this phenomenon a “priming effect” because 
its results are brief; boxing matches presumably trigger violent acts in 
men who already have a high level of aggression (Berkowitz 1984).
Phillips’ important and provocative research does not, however, 
explain the assassinations of celebrities, which usually require careful 
planning over a period of time. To explain these horrendous events, we 
need to notice a paradox about television. The easy access of television—
no special skills are needed to watch it—does not translate into easy 
access to television. Yet once one does achieve access to television for 
a while, that access becomes generalized in such a way as to make the 
original achievement irrelevant. To take only one of many possible 
examples, former baseball player Joe DiMaggio receives a handsome 
salary for making television commercials for Mr. Coffee coffeemakers. 
He can do this not because he has any special expertise about coffee or 
coffeemakers but because he is a celebrity. Although he achieved fame 
with genuine achievements as an athlete, there is no direct relationship 
between his achievements and his commercials. People like DiMaggio 
resemble those products whose labels proclaim “As Advertised on TV.” 
To see something advertised on television, and to know that millions 
of other people have seen it advertised on television, is to know that 
it has become part of the national consciousness. To paraphrase what 
Saussure once said of language, such a product is a social fact. Similarly, 
people who frequently appear on television also become social facts—
regardless of what they do. It was this situation to which Daniel Boorstin 
was referring a number of years ago when he commented that “The 
celebrity is a person who is known for his well-knownness” (1962:57). 
That is to say, television tends to make agonistic structures irrelevant.
To understand why television produces celebrities in Boorstin’s 
sense of the word, we may have recourse to etymology. In Russian, the 
verb “to turn on,” as in “to turn on the television set,” is vklyuchit’. This 
verb also has meaning, still in active use, “to include,” and is derived 
from the noun klyuch, “key.” Thus, to turn something on is to include 
yourself in it, to use a key to
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enter something. When we turn on the television set, we in effect include 
it in the larger electrical circuit of the house.
When we turn on a television set, we literally include it in a 
circuit, but we also do something else as well; we are acknowledging 
our exclusion from the human circuit formed by the people whom we see 
on television. It is this sense of exclusion from the polis for which print 
media such as the infamous National Inquirer compensate. They form 
secondary circuits which include Americans, especially working-class 
Americans, in the gossip going around in the global village. This is, of 
course, the function of chatty headlines such as “What Johnny’s Really 
Paying—It’s More Than You Were Told.” Although celebrities despise 
the National Inquirer and others like it, these publications perform a 
useful service by offering their readers the feeling of being included.
For as of now, they do not feel included. After all, some people 
become well-known without enduring any apparent agonistic struggle 
and without achieving anything notable except through the media. 
Johnny Carson and Dan Rather, for example, are known; they exist in 
the consciousness of millions of people whom they have never met. 
There’s the rub, for television is a one-way medium which does not allow 
the interaction of dialogue. Director Peter Bogdanovich articulated the 
psychological tensions which result from the lack of reciprocity between 
celebrities and their admirers when he wrote, “It’s a feeling I’ve had with 
several movie stars I’ve met—knowing them so much better than they 
could ever know me—and fi nding it impossible to satisfactorily bridge 
the gap” (1973:100). Indeed, we know celebrities so much better than 
they will ever know us; this inescapable fact does create an unbridgeable 
gap. To explain the signifi cance of celebrities, I propose a new meaning 
for the verb “to mediate,” a meaning which helps to explain the cycle of 
violence directed at public fi gures beginning with the assassination of 
President Kennedy in 1963 and (one may hope) culminating with John 
Hinckley, Jr.’s attempt on President Reagan’s life in 1982.
The verb “to mediate” obviously comes form the Latin medium 
and thus it usually means “to be in the middle of something,” as when 
someone mediates a labor dispute. We need an additional meaning for 
this word, a meaning which derives from the meaning of “medium” in 
the phrase “communications medium.” This new meaning will describe 
the way communications media make people well known, with no 
reference to the reason for what
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Boorstin calls their “well-knownness.” Television makes celebrities out 
of people by giving them media attention; it mediates them. We may 
thus speak of people such as Joe DiMaggio as mediated. DiMaggio’s 
career as a spokesperson for Mr. Coffee shows that to become a mediated 
person in a highly technologized society is to acquire great power and 
potentially great wealth.
A very persuasive example of this principle recently appeared in 
an article on the people who make large sums of money on the lecture 
circuit. In it, James S. Kunen advises his readers: “If you want to make it 
in the speaking game, you have to remember one thing: Nobody comes 
to hear the speech. People come to hear celebrities, to be in the same 
room with them” (1984:355). And who are these celebrities? An agent at 
a speaker’s bureau commented, “To the extent you’re on TV, that’s the 
extent you’re known” (idem). Here, as with so much else in American 
life today, the medium is the message.
This situation has important implications for our society; 
moreover, all of these implications are unforeseen, as the implications 
of media change usually are. Consider, for example, the social 
stratifi cation implied in the phrase “global village.” The village in a true 
oral society usually has a clearly defi ned hierarchy. Similarly, in our age 
of secondary orality television has created a quasi-feudal society which 
consists of two classes, mediated people and unmediated people. Since 
it is television which creates the global village, in effect only mediated 
people live in the global village; only they are included in the network. 
Everyone else is on the outside looking in.
However, this mediated hierarchy of secondary orality exists 
without what we might call the conceptual infrastructure of the hierarchies 
in oral society. That is to say, the hierarchy formed by mediated people 
exists in defi ance of the supposedly democratic principles of American 
society, according to which everyone is equal. Unmediated people 
simply are not, and cannot be, equal to mediated people in America 
today; they have not entered the circuit of social facts. To be sure, 
American society has never been as egalitarian as people liked to think it 
was, and hierarchies have always existed in it. The difference is that this 
mediated hierarchy is constantly on display. It provides constant proof 
that not everyone is equal, that not everyone belongs in the circuit.
Father Ong enunciated one of the principles of his life’s work 
when he wrote: “It is through the ability to communicate that
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man achieves a sense of belonging” (1971:119). Those who remain 
unmediated cannot communicate with those who are, and thus they do 
not belong. The results of this situation now seem clear. We can say 
that it is the absence of institutionalized agonistic structures which has 
brought on much of the violence directed at mediated people in recent 
years. In a highly technologized society, a few unbalanced young men 
will compensate for the absence of ritualized combat with planned 
aggression in the form of assassinations.
Such considerations allow us to make sense of the bizarre acts of 
violence which began with the assassination of our fi rst fully mediated 
president, John F. Kennedy, in 1963. President Kennedy was a television 
star before he became president and indeed the conventional wisdom has 
it that he became president because he was a television star. Although 
we have reason to doubt that we know, or ever will know, the complete 
story of this epochal event, it set in motion a series of events in which 
unmediated people struck out at mediated people. They did so in order 
to relieve the increasingly severe tension of not belonging.
We may refer to the need to commit violent acts simply in order 
to become famous as the Herostratus complex, after the Greek who in 
356 BC set fi re to the temple of Artemis in Ephesus in order to make his 
name immortal. In recent times, the Herostratus complex seems to begin 
with Sirhan Sirhan, the assassin of Robert F. Kennedy. After he shot 
Senator Kennedy in 1968, he said, “They can gas me. But I am famous, 
I achieved in a day what it took Kennedy all his life to do” (Ellis and 
Gullo 1971:230). It is Sirhan’s use of the word “achieved” that shows 
the agonistic quality of his act.
Yet Sirhan was not as self-consciously narcissistic as Arthur 
Bremer, would-be assassin of George Wallace in 1972. Bremer presents 
an exceptionally pure example of Peter Pan Syndrome, in which, 
Kiley says, “narcissism locks the young man inside his own fantasies” 
(1983:31). Bremer’s fantasies derived from his media experience, but 
eventually became completely self-contained, and gave him a bizarre 
combination of honesty and amorality.
Like a typical Peter Pan, Bremer was unable to sustain 
relationships of any kind, so he took to keeping a journal (which he 
copyrighted, with an eye to his future fame). In it, he constantly berated 
himself as a failure and an outsider. Still, Bremer clearly understood 
what he wanted. He wanted fame, just
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as Sirhan Sirhan had fi ve years previously. He wrote: “But I want them 
all to know. I want a big shot & not a little pot noise” (1973:97). This 
loner who wanted a bang not a whimper had no political convictions 
or motivations whatsoever (this fact seems to distinguish American 
assassination attempts from those in Europe). He simply wanted to 
become mediated, and shooting a public fi gure was the only way he could 
think of to achieve this goal. He originally planned to shoot President 
Nixon, and followed him to Canada in late 1971 with this purpose in 
mind. Since it was the image of the act and not the act itself which 
mattered to Bremer, he tended to fantasize that he was Fred Astaire: 
“To wear a white tie & tails and get Nixon-boy, WOW! If I killed 
him while wearing a sweaty tee-shirt, some of the fun and Glamore 
would defi onently be worn off” (Bremer’s spelling and capitalization; 
1973:81).
But after stalking Nixon for a while, Bremer decided that Secret 
Service men were too vigilant, so he reluctantly settled on George 
Wallace as a substitute victim. He complained to his journal that shooting 
Wallace would not make him as famous as shooting Nixon: “I won’t 
even rate a T.V. enteroption [sic] in Russia or Europe when the news 
breaks—they never heard of Wallace” (1973:105).
Commenting on Bremer’s narcissism, Harding Lemay has 
said: “It becomes clear that this journal is, in effect, a fi lm scenario” 
(1973:19). Since Bremer had such obsessive dreams of mediation, it 
is only appropriate that the motif of the pathological loner as assassin 
became mediated in two major fi lms of the 1970’s, Robert Altman’s 
Nashville (1975), and Martin Scorsese’s Taxi Driver (1976). The 
interrelationships which obtain between these fi lms and American 
society in the seventies are so complex and delicate that each deserves 
at least a brief discussion.
The fi rst shot of Nashville suggests a possible revision of 
Chairman Mao’s saying, “Power is what comes out of a gun”; it shows 
a van mounted with loudspeakers for use in a political campaign. In 
America, power is what comes out of a loudspeaker: mediated speech. 
Moreover, all the characters in Nashville are either mediated, or want 
to become mediated. Most of the action deals with the machinations 
necessary to persuade various country and western singers to appear at a 
rally for a maverick presidential candidate. Nashville thus has particular 
importance in the present context because it is the fi rst fi lm which 
dramatizes the similarities
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between politics and show business as related forms of mediation. 
Politics and show business come together at the rally at the end of the 
fi lm, where a character clearly based on Arthur Bremer shoots one of the 
singers, Barbara Jean.
In contrast to the diffuse structure of Nashville, which has 
some two dozen characters, Taxi Driver isolates the pathological male 
loner who becomes a would-be assassin. The title character, Travis 
Bickle (played by Robert DeNiro) fantasizes about shooting a political 
condidate; foiled by good security as Bremer was when he attempted to 
shoot President Nixon, he ultimately saves a young prostitute (played by 
Jodie Foster) from her pimp in a scene of extraordinary violence. Shots 
of newspaper clippings then tell us that his action has made Bickle a 
local hero, a fact which the girl’s father confi rms to him in a telephone 
conversation. This public recognition does not make us perceive him as 
any less psychotic, however. Interestingly, fi lm historian Robert Kolker 
argues that Bickle’s insanity comes from mediation: “The more deeply 
he [Travis] withdraws, the more he comes to believe in the American 
movie myths of purity and heroism, love and selfl essness, and to actuate 
them as the legitimate child of John Wayne and Norman Bates: pure, 
self-righteous, violent ego and grinning, homicidal lunatic; each the 
obverse of the other; each equally dangerous” (1980:236).
John Hinckley, Jr. failed to understand such subtleties; he took 
Taxi Driver at face value, as just another American movie with a happy 
ending. For him, Taxi Driver was a dream come true. After all, Travis 
got what he wanted—those newspaper clippings made him a mediated 
person, and he saved Jodie Foster. In Taxi Driver Hinckley saw his 
fantasies of becoming mediated made into a romance and acted out. 
As it happens, he saw the fi lm in Los Angeles where—like Charlie 
Manson—he had gone in the hopes of fi nding fame and fortune as a 
songwriter. Like Manson, he failed, but he found a surrogate identity in 
Travis Bickle. As a psychiatrist who studied him commented, “in even 
the smallest aspects of his behavior, clothes, drinking and so forth, he 
picked up habits of Travis Bickle” (Latham 1982:18).
Hinckley completed this identity with a fi xation on Jodie Foster. 
Ms. Foster was attending Yale at the time, and Hinckley made several 
trips to New Haven in order to propose marriage to her and/or shoot her. 
Only an hour before he made the attempt on President Reagan’s life, on 
30 March, 1982, Hinckley wrote her
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a letter in which he said “I will admit to you that the reason I am going 
ahead with this attempt now is because I just cannot wait any longer to 
impress you. . . . Jodie, I am asking you, please look into your heart and 
at least give me the chance with this historical deed to gain your respect 
and love” (Latham 1982:54). In terms of the present discussion, Hinckley 
is thinking logically, if not rationally. Like Bremer, he had no political 
motives; indeed, he thought that President Reagan was “the greatest 
president of the century.” But he understood that he was not a mediated 
person, and that Foster was. And he understood all too clearly that this 
difference constituted an unbridgeable gap between them. By shooting 
the president, he would commit a “historical deed”; he would bridge the 
gap by becoming mediated like her, and thus worthy of her “respect and 
love.” He was, and still is, suffering from unrequited narcissism.
When Hinckley set out to shoot the President, he had a gun in 
one hand and a John Lennon button in the other, for he had gone into a 
deep depression upon hearing of Lennon’s death on 9 December 1981. 
One of his many contemporaries who also loved the Beatles was Mark 
David Chapman, the man who had shot Lennon. If we merely substitute 
John Lennon for Travis Bickle, Chapman’s crime shows a pathogenesis 
with remarkable similarities to Hinckley’s.
As a child, Chapman was a loner who withdrew into a fantasy 
world. He created in his mind a imaginary kingdom, with himself 
as king, and ordered the Beatles to give concerts for his subjects. As 
he grew older, this kingdom evolved into a democracy, of which he 
was president. Yet he was a God-like president, and God-like powers 
required mediation. At Chapman’s sentencing, a forensic psychiatrist 
offered the following testimony: “In fact, he told me that he was not 
physically more remote from his people. He explained to me that just 
as God cannot reveal Himself directly to me, so he could not reveal 
himself directly to the ‘little people.’ Television was the way in which 
he could communicate with them” (Kempton 1981:14). Like Hinckley, 
Chapman’s dreams of mediation led him to choose a mediated role 
model—in this case, John Lennon. Like Hinckley, he began to imitate 
his role model as literally as possible. At a time when Lennon was 
not recording, and letting his wife Yoko Ono handle all his business 
transactions, Chapman married an Oriental woman who worked while 
he stayed at home. On his last day of work, he
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signed out as John Lennon, just as Hinckley had registered at a motel 
as J. Travis.
Unfortunately, Chapman succeeded where Hinckley, fortunately, 
failed. Despite this crucial difference, they both thought of themselves 
as saviors. Hinckley wished to save Jodie Foster, as Travis Bickle had 
saved the character she played in Taxi Driver. All of these psychopaths 
needed models from which to take an identity, and Chapman found his 
model as a savior fi gure in Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye. To the 
consternation of his psychiatrist, and of the general public, Chapman 
insisted that he was the catcher in the rye. And, like Hinckley in his 
letter to Foster, he was reasoning logically if not rationally.
We recall that Holden Caulfi eld, the protagonist of Salinger’s 
novel, fantasizes that he will stand in a rye fi eld and catch the children 
who are playing there before they fall over a cliff. By killing his idol 
John Lennon, Chapman believed in a way which he apparently could 
not articulate that he was saving children. And what was he saving 
them from? He was saving them from the agony, which he himself 
experienced daily, of having to admit that he was unmediated. Since 
the Beatles were the most famous group of the sixties, and Lennon was 
widely recognized as its leader, Lennon was intensely mediated, as it 
were. The death of Lennon, then, would decrease the tension between 
mediated and unmediated people because it would remove one of the 
most mediated people of our time.
This discussion of assassins, Hollywood movies, and the death 
of a rock star may have seemed to take us from the more traditional 
subjects which usually concern Walter Ong. Yet no one whose life has 
been enriched by his interest in all cultural phenomena can afford to 
ignore the irenic potential of dialogue about the popular culture which 
surrounds us every day, and which is sometimes a matter of life and 
death.1
University of Missouri/Columbia 
Note
1This paper has profited from the bibliographical and editorial suggestions of Thomas 
Farrell.
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